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CASENOTE
Criminal Law-FLORIDA ADOPTS A DuAL APPROACH TO
ENTRAPMENT-Cruz v. State, 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1985)
On the night of March 1, 1982, a police officer leaned against a
building in downtown Tampa. His appearance, however, was far
from what one would ordinarily expect from a police officer.
Dressed as a typical inhabitant of skid row, the officer, doused in
alcohol, pretended to drink wine from a bottle and simulated in-
toxication. Protruding from his rear right pants pocket was $150 in
currency which had been fastened together with a paper clip. Some
time after 10:00 p.m., Pedro Cruz, accompanied by a woman, ap-
proached what he assumed to be a drunken bum and then walked
away. Ten to fifteen minutes later, the two returned and Cruz
lifted the money from the pocket of the disguised officer. Cruz
walked away and was arrested by backup officers down the block.
Although there had been some unsolved crimes in the area where
the drunken wino decoy was located, none of the crimes had in-
volved the same type of victim or the same modus operandi. The
police were not aware of any prior criminal acts by Cruz, and they
were not seeking to snare any particular individual.
At trial, Cruz moved to dismiss the grand theft charge under
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) on the ground that,
as a matter of law, the undisputed facts showed he was trapped by
the police.' The trial court granted the motion.2 The Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order of dismissal. 3
The Second District approved the state's contention that the de-
fense of entrapment may be successfully invoked only by a defend-
ant who is not predisposed to commit a crime. Reasoning that pre-
disposition focuses on the defendant's intent or state of mind, the
court held that this issue must be decided by a jury after all the
evidence has been presented and not by a judge on a motion to
dismiss. 4 However, the court acknowledged that its decision di-
1. State v. Cruz, 426 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1310; see also State v. J.T.S., 373 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), disapproved
on other grounds, 470 So. 2d 1387, 1389 (Fla. 1985).
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rectly conflicted with State v. Casper,5 in which the First District
held that in some situations a question of entrapment may be de-
cided as a matter of law by a judge.'
In 1985, the Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction of the
Cruz case based upon express and direct conflict of decisions.7 In
reversing the decision of the Second District, the supreme court
not only resolved the conflict between Cruz and Casper, but also
set forth a new test for the defense of entrapment. The court com-
bined the so-called subjective test, which is based on predisposi-
tion of the defendant, with an objective test, which is based on the
propriety of the police conduct." The new test calls for the trial
court to make a threshold determination of whether the police ac-
tivity in the particular case overreached the bounds of permissible
conduct. If this question is answered in the affirmative, entrap-
ment exists as a matter of law. However, if the validity of the po-
lice conduct is established, the question remains as to whether the
defendant was predisposed to commit the alleged offense. This
question, the court reasoned, is properly for the jury to decide.
This Note analyzes and contrasts the evolution of the entrap-
ment defense in the federal system with the development of the
defense in Florida. The Note outlines Florida's new dual approach
to the entrapment defense and examines its implications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Before discussing the origin and development of the entrapment
defense, it is necessary to identify the traditional rules which have
governed the doctrine of entrapment. The apprehension of true
criminals has always been a socially desirable goal of criminal jus-
tice. To this end, the police9 are allowed to use decoys and set
traps in certain instances in order to catch a suspect in the com-
mission of a crime or to detect his plan and prevent him from act-
ing. 10 These police tactics are especially important when dealing
with consensual crimes that are difficult to detect and often are
5. 426 So. 2d at 1310.
6. 417 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
7. 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3527 (1985).
8. The Florida Supreme Court followed the reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court
in State v. Molnar, 410 A.2d 37 (N.J. 1980).
9. The term "police" is used in this Note to refer to government law enforcement agents
or persons working for those agents.
10. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932). "Artifice and stratagem may be
employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises." Id.
ENTRAPMENT
committed against willing victims.11 However, when the criminal
conduct becomes the product of the creative activity of the police,
and the accused is induced by the police to commit the crime, the
defendant may assert that he was entrapped. 2
The acceptable roles of the police and defendants depend upon
the particular jurisdiction's view of entrapment. Currently, there
are two views of entrapment. Courts in a majority of jurisdictions
have taken a subjective approach, 3 while a minority have taken an
objective approach.14 The subjective view focuses on the intent or
predisposition of the defendant.1 5 Thus, the subjective test is
designed to determine when the intent to commit the crime
originates. Once a defendant has raised the defense of entrapment,
the issue is submitted to the jury to determine whether the de-
fendant intended to commit the crime irrespective of police con-
duct." If the government can establish that the defendant har-
bored an intent to commit the illegal act prior to police
involvement, the defendant will lose on the issue of entrapment no
matter how improper the inducements provided by the police may
be.1 7 The objective view, on the other hand, advocates a test for
11.
Certain types of criminal activity are consensual and covert. Hence they are vir-
tually undetectable without the use of a government agent or an informer. Narcot-
ics peddlers, brokers of counterfeit currency, transporters of prostitutes across
state lines, and gamblers employing interstate facilities to transmit bets all do
business clandestinely. Their victims are willing, sometimes eager, accomplices.
Their crimes are likely to go unchecked unless the government can itself approach
a suspect to offer him the opportunity to commit a crime and thus give evidence
of his guilt.
Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163, 165 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969).
12. "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his pro-
curement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trick-
ery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer." Sorrells, 287 U.S. 454 (Roberts, J., concurring).
13. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435 (1932); State v. Keating, 551 S.W.2d 589 (Mo. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1071 (1978); People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1978).
14. See Hampton, 425 U.S. 484, 495 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Russell, 411 U.S.
423, 436 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 441 (Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting); Sherman, 356 U.S. 369, 384 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells, 287
U.S. 435, 455 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring); Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226 (Alaska
1969); State v. McKinney, 501 P.2d 378 (Ariz. 1972); State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa
1974); State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979).
15. Russell, 411 U.S. at 429 (1973).
16. Because the subjective standard of entrapment centers on the defendant's intent, a
factual issue, the matter generally is submitted to a jury. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 377 n.8.
17. "Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct was 'the product of the creative
activity' of law enforcement officials." Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S.
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entrapment which focuses on the nature of the governmental in-
ducement rather than the predisposition of the defendant.' 8 The
objective test solely examines police activity to determine whether
that activity would be likely to induce a hypothetical ordinary law-
abiding citizen to commit the crime. If it would, then the entrap-
ment defense will be successful. Proponents of the objective ap-
proach seek to deter police misconduct and to keep the criminal
justice system from being soiled by improper conduct. Although
still a minority view, the objective test has been the overwhelming
favorite of legal commentators."9 The American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code and the Brown Commission in its proposed fed-
eral code endorse the minority view by embracing the objective ap-
proach to entrapment.20
at 451 (emphasis added)).
18. See Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV 163, 165-166 (1976). "The
'objective' entrapment test does not compare the defendant's conduct to that of a reasona-
ble person; it evaluates the agent's conduct by considering its probable impact upon a hypo-
thetical law-abiding person." Id. at 165 n.2 (emphasis in original).
19. For a compilation of writings advocating the objective test or some variation thereof,
see Rossum, The Entrapment Defense and The Teaching of Political Responsibility: The
Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 6 AM. JUR. CRiM. LAW 287, 296 n.43, 297 n.44
(1978). For a discussion of the problem and unfairness inherent in the subjective test, see
Note, Entrapment: Time to Take an Objective Look, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 324, 335-339 (1977).
20. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Official Draft 1962); National Commission on Re-
form of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report: A Proposed New Federal Criminal Code §
702(2) (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown Commission Proposal]. Section 2.13 of the Model
Penal Code provides:
(1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such
an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of
the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage
in conduct constituting such offense by either:
(a) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief
that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a sub-
stantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than
those who are ready to commit it.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3) of this Section, a person prosecuted for
an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his
conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be
tried by the Court in the absence of the jury.
(3) The defense afforded by this Section is unavailable when causing or threat-
ening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is
based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the
person perpetrating the entrapment.
Section 702(2) of the Brown Commission Proposal provides:
(2). . . Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement agent induces the commis-
sion of an offense, using persuasion or other means likely to cause normally law-
abiding persons to commit the offense. Conduct merely affording a person an op-
portunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
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II. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE IN
FEDERAL COURTS
The history of entrapment is an ancient one. In 1864, Judge Ba-
con of New York stated that the entrapment plea was "first inter-
posed in Paradise: 'The serpent beguiled me and I did eat.' That
defense was overruled by the great Lawgiver, and . . . has never
since availed."21 It was not until 1915 that the first successful en-
trapment defense was raised in the federal courts,22 which set the
stage for the United States Supreme Court's first major pro-
nouncement on the theory of the defense in the landmark 1932
case of Sorrells v. United States. 3 Sorrells involved a defendant
who sold whiskey in violation of the National Prohibition Act after
refusing on two prior occasions to sell liquor to a government
agent.2" Finding that the defendant was not predisposed to commit
the criminal act, Chief Justice Hughes enunciated what is now
known as the subjective view of entrapment. The critical inquiry,
as stated in the majority opinion, was "whether the defendant is a
person otherwise innocent whom the Government is seeking to
punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the creative
activity of its own officials."'25 However, in a separate concurring
opinion written by Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Stone
and Brandeis, these Justices espoused what is now known as the
objective approach to entrapment. Basing the doctrine on public
policy, Justice Roberts focused on the propriety of the governmen-
tal conduct. He argued that the defense is based upon the court's
power to preserve "the purity of its own temple. '2 6 In short, Jus-
tice Roberts would not permit the process of the courts "to be used
in aid of a scheme for the actual creation of a crime by those whose
21. Board of Comm'rs of Excise v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864)
(quoting Genesis 3:13).
22. Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915). The court found that Woo Wai
had been impermissibly coerced by government agents over an 18 month period to bring
illegal aliens into the United States. However, although the convictions were reversed, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the existing principle that entrapment by government officials was
not a defense. The court, however, held that it was against public policy to sustain a convic-
tion obtained in the manner disclosed by the evidence. Id. at 415. Woo Wai, in effect, was a
forerunner of the "objective" approach to entrapment.
23. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
24. Id. at 439-440. The agent discovered that he and the defendant had served in the
same division during World War I. After discussing their war experiences, the agent re-
quested liquor for a third time and the defendant complied.
25. Id. at 451.
26. Id. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring).
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duty it is to deter its commission. '27 Thus, it was the Sorrells deci-
sion that gave birth to the two opposing views of entrapment
which would remain at the heart of the entrapment issue even fifty
years later.
The Sorrells decision remained undisturbed by the Supreme
Court for nearly a quarter of a century.28 In 1958, the Supreme
Court again faced the issue of entrapment in Sherman v. United
States.29 In Sherman, the defendant was convicted for an illegal
sale of narcotics. Evidence at trial showed that the defendant and
a government agent met each other and became friendly while
both were apparently undergoing drug addiction therapy. The
agent pretended he was not responding to treatment and on sev-
eral occasions asked the defendant to supply him with narcotics.
Eventually the defendant acquiesced and sold the agent a quantity
of drugs. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the conviction.
A majority of the Court found that the defendant had been en-
trapped as a matter of law because he was not predisposed to com-
mit the crime.30 Justice Frankfurter, however, authored a highly
critical concurring opinion that argued strenuously for a "re-exam-
ination to achieve clarity of thought."31 Adopting the view ex-
pressed by Justice Roberts in his opinion in Sorrells, Justice
Frankfurter stated that the court should direct its attention to the
conduct of the police and the methods employed by the govern-
ment to bring about the conviction, not to the character and pre-
disposition of the defendant.2 Justice Frankfurter, however, was
unwilling to state a uniform standard by which governmental tac-
tics were to be evaluated. Instead, he believed, the courts should
use "as objective a test as the subject matter permits," determining
the propriety of police conduct on a case-by-case basis."
27. Id. at 454 (Roberts, J., concurring).
28. Following the Sorrells decision, only two federal courts refused to adhere to the ma-
jority view that the defendant's predisposition is determinative of the defense of entrap-
ment. See Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957); Wall v. United States, 65
F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1933).
29. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
30. Chief Justice Warren reasoned that "[tlo determine whether entrapment has been
established, a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for
the unwary criminal." Id. at 372.
31. Id. at 379 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
32. In a frequently cited passage, Justice Frankfurter stated that "[t]he crucial question,
not easy of answer, to which the court must direct itself is whether the police conduct re-
vealed in the particular case falls below standards, to which common feelings respond, for
the proper use of governmental power." Id. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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More than a decade after the Sherman decision, United States
v. Russell3 " renewed an entrapment dialogue among members of
the Court. A government agent suspected the defendant in Russell
of manufacturing and selling an illegal drug. During an undercover
investigation, the agent offered to supply the defendant with a nec-
essary but difficult to obtain ingredient needed for the manufac-
ture of the drug in return for a portion of the drug produced. The
defendant received the ingredient from the agent, completed the
manufacturing process, and was later arrested and convicted. The
Ninth Circuit expanded the traditional notion of entrapment and
reversed the conviction. 5 Instead of focusing on the predisposition
of the defendant, the court of appeals based its reversal on a find-
ing that the constitutional principles of due process had been vio-
lated by "an intolerable degree of governmental participation in
the criminal enterprise." 3 However, on review, Justice Rehnquist,
speaking for a five-member majority of the Supreme Court, refused
to elevate the defense of entrapment in this case to constitutional
status.37 He remained adamant that the Court should continue its
adherence to the doctrine announced in Sorrells and Sherman and
accordingly found that Russell's predisposition to commit the
crime was fatal to his entrapment defense. 38 In a dissenting opin-
ion, Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, 9
criticized the Court's continued emphasis on predisposition as mis-
leading. He concluded that the purpose of the defense is to "pro-
hibit unlawful governmental activity in instigating crime. '40 Jus-
tice Stewart recognized that the majority's emphasis on
predisposition had the effect of making what was proper or im-
proper police conduct depend upon the past record of the accused.
34. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
35. United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972).
36. Id. at 673.
37. Justice Rehnquist did not foreclose the due process defense as a basis for acquittal in
other circumstances. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-432. In fact, since the opinion in Russell,
several courts have invoked the due process entrapment defense to reverse a defendant's
conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Borum, 584 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D.
Pa. 1980), rev'd en banc, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); State v.
Glosson, 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1985). But see Brown v. State, 11 Fla. L.W. 621 (Fla. 3d DCA
1985) (no denial of due process in police fencing operation; no entrapment as a matter of
law under first prong of Cruz test).
38. 411 U.S. at 436.
39. Justice Douglas, dissenting with a separate opinion, argued for the objective test es-
poused by Justices Roberts and Frankfurter. Id. at 436 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 442 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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He argued that there is no reason to permit the police to use what
would normally be considered an improper tactic solely because a
person had broken the law in the past. 1 Thus, the objective theory
of entrapment continued to attract only a minority of the Court's
members, albeit a strong minority.
In the Supreme Court's fourth and most recent attempt to end
confusion surrounding the entrapment defense, the Court decided
the case of Hampton v. United States.42 Flatly rejecting any due
process defense in the case, the plurality opinion of Justice Rehn-
quist clearly states that the only acceptable test of entrapment is
the subjective test from Sorrells, Sherman, and Russell.4" In a con-
curring opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun,
agreed that the defense of entrapment should focus on the predis-
position of the accused. However, these Justices were unwilling to
completely foreclose the Court's power to bar a conviction of a
predisposed defendant when there was evidence of outrageous po-
lice behavior." In a dissenting opinion written by Justice Brennan
and joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, the minority again
urged the adoption of an objective theory of entrapment.45 Because
of the Court's split in Hampton, entrapment law is still in a state
of confusion. Although a majority of the Court embraces the sub-
jective approach to entrapment, significant concurring and dissent-
ing opinions are evidence that the issue has not been finally
decided.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE IN FLORIDA BEFORE
Cruz
Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized and
developed the defense of entrapment for more than fifty years, the
Florida judiciary is not constrained to follow the Court's decisions
41. Id. at 442-444 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
42. 425 U.S. 484 (1976). Hampton was convicted of two counts of distributing heroin in
violation of federal narcotics laws. The drugs he sold, however, had all been supplied by a
government informant. Hampton sought to use the due process entrapment defense that
was implicitly left available by Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Russell. See supra note 37.
Hampton argued that because the government agent supplied him with the drugs that he
had been convicted of selling, the government had engaged in conduct "so outrageous that
due process principles would bar [conviction]." Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-432.
43. 425 U.S. at 489. Indeed, the Court ruled out "the possibility that the defense of
entrapment could ever be based upon governmental misconduct in a case, such as this one,
where the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime was established." Id.
44. Id. at 493-94 (Powell, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 495-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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because the defense of entrapment arises from public policy rather
than from the United States Constitution.4 6 Nevertheless, until re-
cently, Florida courts have generally followed the direction of the
United States Supreme Court in recognizing the subjective rather
than the objective view of entrapment. 47 The first case to establish
the entrapment defense in Florida was Lashley v. State s. 4  The
Florida Supreme Court stated the rule of entrapment as follows:
One who is instigated, induced, or lured by an officer of the law or
other person, for the purpose of prosecution, into the commission
of a crime which he had otherwise no intention of committing
may avail himself of the defense of "entrapment." Such defense is
not available, however, where the officer or other person acted in
good faith for the purpose of discovering or detecting a crime and
merely furnished the opportunity for the commission thereof by
one who had the requisite criminal intent.49
Nine years later, the state defined the evidentiary burdens-of the
defense in Dupuy v. State.5" In that case, the Board of Dental Ex-
aminers set out to uncover evidence of unauthorized practice of
dentistry by making "routine checks" on area dental laboratories. 1
An investigator offered to pay a dental technician to make a partial
plate for him, which the defendant did. Later, a second investiga-
tor asked for and received the same services. The defendant was
subsequently arrested and convicted for the unauthorized practice
of dentistry. On appeal, the Third District found that the investi-
gators' activities constituted entrapment as a matter of law be-
cause the state failed to present any evidence, other than the com-
46. Kimmons v. State, 322 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), cert. dismissed, 336 So. 2d 106,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 923 (1976).
47. A few courts, however, have refused to focus on predisposition and have based their
holdings on the impropriety of the police conduct irrespective of the defendant's predisposi-
tion. See Dupuy v. State, 141 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 147 So. 2d 531 (Fla.
1962); Spencer v. State, 263 So. 2d 282 (Fla st DCA), cert. denied, 267 So. 2d 835 (Fla.
1972); Thomas v. State, 185 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966).
48. 67 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1953). The facts show that two undercover police officers entered
an establishment known as Lashley's Place where they approached Mr. Lashley about hiring
a prostitute. Mr. Lashley made the arrangement and was arrested and subsequently con-
victed of operating a brothel. At trial, Mr. Lashley claimed he was entrapped by the induce-
ments of the undercover police officers. The supreme court, finding that the defendant had
previous intent to commit the crime, rejected that argument.
49. Id. at 649 (quoting 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 45 (1961) (emphasis in original)).
50. 141 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962).
51. These investigations were not prompted by any evidence, complaint, or suspicion
that the defendant was practicing dentistry without a license. Id. at 826.
1986] 1179
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mission of the crime, to show predisposition of the defendant. The
court stated that "where the defense of entrapment is raised it is
incumbent upon the state to make a showing amounting to more
than mere surmise and speculation that the intent to commit
crime originated in the mind of the accused and not in the minds
of the officers of the government."52
The objective test first emerged in Florida in Koptyra v. State.53
An undercover agent cultivated a friendship with the defendant
and two other people over a period of four months. One night,
while at the residence of one of the other people involved, the
agent observed the defendant and his companions smoking a mari-
juana cigarette. 54 The agent arrested them and the defendant was
convicted of unlawfully possessing marijuana. On appeal, the Sec-
ond District found no error in the trial court's denial of a jury in-
struction on entrapment.55 The court indicated that there was no
evidence that the defendant was enticed to possess marijuana
which he would not have otherwise possessed." The important
point, however, is that the court did consider the actions of the
agent, thus implicitly approving some focus on the propriety of the
police conduct in addition to considering the predisposition of the
defendant. 57 After Koptyra, other appellate courts explicitly voiced
their approval of at least some focus on police conduct. Cases from
the Third and Fourth District Courts stated that "[the rule as to
the defense of entrapment arises from decency, good faith, fairness
and justice, and the conduct of state agents as well as the defend-
ants' disposition must be considered in determining whether the
defense is available." 58 The Second District in Thomas v. State59
52. Id. at 827. The law in Florida is that once a defendant shows any evidence of entrap-
ment, it is incumbent upon the state to prove that the accused was predisposed to commit
the offense charged in order to negate the defense of entrapment. In other words, the state
has the burden of disproving entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Wheeler, 468
So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1985); Story v. State, 355 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); see also FLORIDA
STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 3.04(c) (1981).
53. 172 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965).
54. Id. at 630.
55. Id. at 632.
56. Id. at 632-33.
57. "The inspector had no knowledge that the defendant had previously been convicted
of a crime. . . . The inspector had not previously seen them with marijuana; he did not
specifically request them to obtain the marijuana received in evidence. . . . He did not fur-
nish the money to make the purchase. The defendant and his companions were using the
marijuana before the inspector arrived." Id.
58. State v. Rouse, 239 So. 2d 79, 80 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970) (citing Thomas v. State, 185
So. 2d 745, 747 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)).
59. 243 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971).
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also moved toward embracing the objective theory of entrapment
when it stated that "[t]he critical issue on entrapment would be
the purpose and motive of the . . . [plolice [d]epartment or its
representatives."' 0 The strongest endorsement of the objective
standard of entrapment, however, came from the First District in
the case of Spencer v. State." The facts of that case show that a
female undercover agent was picked up by Spencer in a bar and
later accompanied him to his apartment. At the apartment the
agent drank wine and discussed marijuana. Spencer then produced
some marijuana that a friend had left in a closet of the apartment.
Because Spencer had no means to smoke the marijuana, the agent
volunteered to go to a store to buy cigarette papers. The agent re-
turned with the papers and they smoked some of the marijuana.
Spencer was arrested and subsequently convicted of possessing
marijuana. The court of appeal, stating that the agent provided
more than a mere opportunity to commit a crime, found the de-
fendant had been entrapped as a matter of law. The court reiter-
ated that "[g]overnment detection methods must measure up to
reasonably decent standards. . . . It is beneath the dignity of the
State of Florida to allow female agents to appear to be of question-
able virtue in order to lure men into committing the crime of
smoking marijuana. '6 2
Although a majority of Florida's district courts of appeal ap-
proved the subjective theory of entrapment, judges in several ma-
jority and dissenting opinions continued to cling to the objective
test. For instance, the court in Roundtree v. State63 found entrap-
ment where the criminal intent or design originated in the mind of
the person seeking to entrap the accused for the sole purpose of
arresting and prosecuting him. Later, in Smith v. State," Judge
McNulty wrote a well reasoned dissent that focused on police mis-
conduct. Although recognizing that the state may in good faith fur-
nish a predisposed person with an opportunity to commit a crime,
60. Id. at 203.
61. 263 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972).
62. Id. at 283. The court stated that the state should not have "its paid agents out trol-
ling for unsuspecting males whose minds are otherwise occupied than with thoughts of com-
mitting heinous crimes." Id. at 284.
63. 271 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972), cert. denied, 276 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1973). An
undercover agent attended college with and befriended the defendant. During the summer,
the defendant discussed selling the agent some marijuana. No sale occurred at that time,
although the agent and defendant saw each other often. In the fall, the agent initiated two
attempts to obtain marijuana from the defendant and finally succeeded on the third try.
64. 320 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1976).
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Judge McNulty stated that "gross participation" by the state in
the commission of an offense would negate the requisite good faith
of the state in its efforts to detect and prevent crime. 65 In this case,
an agent induced the defendant, a junkie, to purchase heroin by
giving her a portion of the buy. Although the defendant was
predisposed to commit the offense, Judge McNulty felt that the
agent improperly took advantage of the defendant's drug
addiction.66
In 1979, in an effort to end the confusion over whether the focus
of the entrapment test should be on the predisposition of the de-
fendant (the subjective test) or on the acceptability of the police
conduct (the objective test), the Florida Supreme Court decided
State v. Dickinson.67 The Dickinson court affirmed the subjective
test by holding that a high degree of participation by law enforce-
ment agents in the crime did not necessarily constitute entrapment
if the accused had the predisposition to commit the crime. The
court held that "[t]he essential element of the defense of entrap-
ment is the absence of a predisposition of the defendant to commit
the offense." 68 Accordingly, where the defense of entrapment is
raised, the state must show predisposition by establishing:
(1) proof of prior similar criminal activities of the defend-
ant; or
(2) reputation for engaging in certain illicit activities; or
(3) the officers reasonable suspicion that the defendant was
engaged in illegal activities; or
(4) the defendant's ready acquiescence in the commission of
the crime. 9
The holding in Dickinson was later followed by the Second District
65. Id. at 423 (McNulty, J., dissenting).
66. 320 So. 2d at 424 (McNulty, J., dissenting).
67. 370 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1979).
68. Id. at 763.
69. Story v. State, 355 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 893 (Fla.
1978). The court in Story receded from its earlier decision in Roundtree. In Story, the police
sought to induce the defendant to sell them some heroin for the purpose of prosecuting the
defendant. However, no entrapment was found because the defendant's "ready acquies-
cence" to the crime demonstrated his predisposition. See also State v. Liptak, 277 So. 2d 19
(Fla. 1973) (proof of prior criminal acts); Kimmons v. State, 322 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA
1975) (defendant's reputation for engaging in certain illicit activities); Brosi v. State, 263 So.
2d 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972) (officers' reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in
illegal activities).
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in State v. Brider °.70 In Brider, the defendant claimed entrapment
as a matter of law because the state had furnished the defendant
with the marijuana which he was later charged with handling. Al-
though recognizing the minority trend of focusing the entrapment
defense on police misconduct, the court of appeal emphasized that
there was no entrapment as a matter of law where the evidence
would support a conclusion that the defendant had a predisposi-
tion to commit the crime.7
IV. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN Cruz v. State
The most recent word in Florida regarding the defense of en-
trapment has come from the Florida Supreme Court in the case of
Cruz v. State.7 2 This case was heard by the supreme court because
of a conflict with State v. Casper.7 3 In Casper, the First District
was presented with a police decoy scenario which involved a police
officer disguised as a drunken wino. The decoy, complete with a set
of old clothes and the aroma of alcohol, lay on a sidewalk in down-
town Jacksonville. Several bills amounting to $150 were stapled to-
gether and protruded visibly from the decoy's pocket. The decoy
was told to feign unconsciousness. Apparently, this decoy opera-
tion was instituted because several robberies and purse snatchings
had occurred in the general area. On April 28, 1981, the defendant
walked past the decoy, but then returned, reached down and re-
moved the protruding money. The defendant was arrested down
the street. The defendant had not been targeted as a suspect in
any purse snatchings or robberies, nor did he have a criminal rec-
ord. At trial, the defendant raised the issue of entrapment. The
trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and the court
of appeal affirmed without opinion. On a petition for rehearing,
the court outlined the reasons for its affirmance of the dismissal.
The court stated that where the defense of entrapment is raised,
the state must show that the defendant was predisposed to commit
the crime.7 5 The court recognized that the defendant's predisposi-
70. 386 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 2d DCA), petition for review denied, 392 So. 2d 1372 (Fla.
1980).
71. Id. at 821.
72. 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3527 (1985).
73. 417 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA), petition for review denied, 418 So. 2d 1280 (Fla.
1982).
74. State v. Casper, 415 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
75. 417 So. 2d at 265. The Casper court did implicitly consider the propriety of the
police conduct. The court held that the decoy impermissibly lured Casper into taking the
money and that the decoy did not detect or discover the type of crime the police were
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tion may be shown by his prior criminal activities, his reputation
for such activities, reasonable suspicion of his involvement in crim-
inal activity, or his ready acquiescence to commit the crime.7 1
Finding that the state brought forth no evidence on the first three
criteria, the court examined whether the defendant showed ready
acquiescence to commit the crime. The court found that "[n]o
ready acquiescence is shown; on the contrary, the defendant's acts,
as stated in the motion, demonstrate that he only succumbed to
temptation. 7 7 Thus, in the absence of a showing by the state of
any facts tending to demonstrate predisposition, the First District
held that the trial court properly determined that there had been
entrapment as a matter of law. The First District used this analy-
sis to reach the same conclusion in a later case involving similar
facts. s
The Second District in State v. Cruz79 disagreed with the analy-
sis of the First District in Casper.80 Although agreeing with the
court in Casper that the focus of the entrapment defense should be
on the predisposition of the defendant, the Second District, faced
with an identical factual situation, could not agree that those facts
would constitute entrapment as a matter of law."1 The Second Dis-
trict found that since the focus is on the defendant's intent or state
of mind, (i.e., predisposition), that issue could never be decided as
a matter of law by a judge on a motion to dismiss.82 Thus, the issue
of predisposition, a factual issue, should always be decided by a
jury.
In 1985, the Florida Supreme Court confronted the express con-
flict between State v. Cruz and State v. Casper83 and decided the
issue of whether the predisposition of the defendant is proper for
the court to consider on a motion to dismiss. However, the court
went beyond the immediate issue and developed a new test for en-
trapment in Florida-a test that attempts to reconcile the previ-
attempting to prevent by use of the decoy, i.e., purse snatchings and robberies. Id.
76. Id. (citing Story v. State, 355 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 364 So.
2d 893 (Fla. 1978)).
77. 417 So. 2d at 265.
78. State v. Holliday, 431 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), afJ'd, 465 So. 2d 524 (Fla.
1985).
79. State v. Cruz, 426 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), rev'd, 465 So. 2d 516; see also
State v. Sokos, 426 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
80. State v. Casper, 415 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
81. 426 So. 2d at 1309.
82. Id. at 1310.
83. Cruz v. State, 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3527 (1985).
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ously conflicting subjective and objective tests. In deciding the ex-
press conflict between Casper and Cruz, the supreme court agreed
with the Second District by holding that "the question of predis-
position will always be a question of fact for the jury. "84 However,
the court further recognized the First District's concern for entrap-
ment scenarios in which an otherwise innocent citizen succumbs to
the temptations offered by improper police tactics. The court
found that "[e]ntrapment is a potentially dangerous tool given to
police to fight crime."8 5 Thus, although some entrapment practices
are needed by the police, these practices need to be controlled. The
court recognized that impermissible police tactics should not be
condoned solely because they are directed against a past offender
who is said to have a criminal disposition. "A contrary view runs
afoul of fundamental principles of equality under law, and would
espouse the notion that when dealing with the criminal classes
anything goes."86 The problem with adopting a purely subjective
view is that it would allow the police to engage in impermissible
police conduct in order to snare a person predisposed to commit
the crime. The court refused to condone such action, thereby af-
fording equal protection to those individuals with a criminal past.
The supreme court in Cruz reconciled the two views on entrap-
ment by formulating a new test which combines the objective and
subjective tests.87 The threshold inquiry, which incorporates the
objective view, is whether the police conduct in a particular case
falls below the standards established by common notions about the
proper use of governmental power. This initial inquiry is directed
to the state and is to be answered by the court. Thus, the state
must prove to the court's satisfaction the validity of the police ac-
tivity.88 As a guideline, the court held that there would be no en-
trapment where the "police activity: (1) has as its end the inter-
ruption of a specific ongoing criminal activity; and (2) utilizes
means reasonably tailored to apprehend those involved in the
ongoing criminal activity."'89 Part one thus discourages police tac-
tics which are not designed to stop ongoing criminal activity.90 Part
84. Id. at 519.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 520 (quoting Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382-383 (1958) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring)).
87. The court based its new formulation on a dual entrapment test adopted by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Talbot, 364 A.2d 9 (N.J. 1976).
88. 465 So. 2d at 521.
89. Id. at 522.
90. This limitation on police conduct has been discussed in decisions from several juris-
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two discourages inappropriate police inducements. A court may
look at factors such as whether the police encouraged another to
commit an offense by either making knowingly false representa-
tions designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohib-
ited, or by employing methods of persuasion which would create a
substantial risk that such an offense would be committed by a per-
son not already predisposed to commit it.91 After the threshold
question has been addressed and the state establishes that the po-
lice conduct has not been improper, then the question remains
whether the criminal design was induced by the police or
originated with the accused. "This question is answered by decid-
ing whether the defendant was predisposed, and is properly for the
jury to decide." 9
When the supreme court in Cruz applied the new entrapment
test to the factual situation at hand, it found that the drunken
wino decoy failed the initial inquiry under the objective test. The
decoy operation was not designed to stop any ongoing criminal ac-
tivity. Even if the trap represented an attempt to stop the ongoing
criminal activity of "rolling drunks," the entire scenario created a
substantial risk that such an offense would be committed by per-
sons other than those ready to commit it.93
dictions. See Dupuy v. State, 141 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962); People v. Turner, 210
N.W.2d 336 (Mich. 1973); People v. Killian, 323 N.W.2d 794 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); People
v. Duis, 265 N.W.2d 794 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Kamrud, 611 P.2d 188 (Mont.
1980); State v. Soroushirn, 571 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1977).
The Second District in Jones v. State, 11 Fla. L.W. 425 (Fla. 2d DCA Feb. 14, 1986) has
developed the first prong of the Cruz test. In this case the record was clear that the police
were interested in intercepting the person responsible for several strong-armed robberies at
a local dog track. However, instead of using tactics likely to intercept the violent armed
robber, the police set up a "drunken bum" decoy similar to the one used in Cruz. The court
held that the police action was not sufficiently tailored to the particular crime and found
entrapment as a matter of law.
91. 465 So.2d at 522. This prong of the Cruz test has been developed by the Second
District in State v. Eichel, 11 Fla. L.W. 660 (Fla. March 12, 1986). This case involved a
female police officer who was engaged in a personal relationship with a defendant who ad-
mitted using drugs. Even after she informed him that she worked for the sherriff's office, the
officer cultivated and encouraged the relationship, told the defendant to "be himself," and
assured him that she would not arrest him even though she was wired and knew that an
arrest was planned. The court held that these knowingly false representations made to the
defendant, coupled with the inducement of a personal, intimate relationship, clearly vio-
lated the second prong of Cruz test.
92. Id. at 521.
93. Id. at 522.
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V. CONCLUSION
Prior to the supreme court's decision in Cruz v. State, Florida
courts had produced conflicting rules of law on the issue of entrap-
ment. Some courts examined the conduct of the government agents
and based their decisions on the objective view of entrapment.
Other courts focused on whether the accused had a prior intent or
predisposition to commit the crime. Those courts based their deci-
sions on the subjective view of entrapment. Some courts even used
both these tests, depending on the factual circumstances of the
case. The supreme court in Cruz combined these divergent views
of entrapment to create a new analysis. The court recognized that
where the police conduct is so reprehensible and improper that
crime is actually created instead of detected, the public's confi-
dence in the police force will be shaken. In response to this fear,
the court developed a new test which protects against unacceptable
police conduct while leaving the factual determination of predispo-
sition to the jury. This is an improvement over the prior case law.
Instead of viewing the two entrapment doctrines as mutually ex-
clusive, the court has taken a bold step by combining the objective
and subjective views into a new test which maximizes the protec-
tion of the general public. The test calls for the trial court to apply
specific factors in making its initial determination of the propriety
of the police conduct. If the court finds the police conduct passes
the test, the question of whether the defendant had the intent to
commit the crime before the police involvement is submitted to
the jury.
Although the Cruz test appears to be a straightforward one, the
impact of this case will depend upon its future application by Flor-
ida's courts. It is clear that decoy operations like the one in Cruz
have been condemned.94 But what other police practices will be
condemned in Florida? The first entrapment decision to apply the
new test to a factual scenario not involving a drunken bum decoy
was rendered by the Third District in Marrero v. State.95 In that
case, the court determined that the defendant had been entrapped
as a matter of law and reversed his conviction of attempted traf-
ficking in cannabis. The defendant had been contacted twenty to
thirty times during a six month period by a police informant who
asked him whether he wanted to sell marijuana. The defendant re-
94. See Teague v. State, 472 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1985).
95. 10 Fla. L.W. 2317 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 8, 1985), affd on rehearing, 11 Fla. L.W. 59
(Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 24, 1985).
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fused each time, stating that such a sale would be illegal, and
asked the informant to stop bothering him. The last time the de-
fendant was approached by the informant he gave in to the request
and agreed to sell the marijuana because of his recent "economical
problems." 96 The Third District applied the threshold test for en-
trapment and concluded that the police activity violated both
prongs of that test.9 7 First, the police were not attempting to inter-
rupt any specific, ongoing criminal activity; the detectives readily
admitted having no information about any prior or ongoing in-
volvement of the defendant in the sale of illegal drugs. Second, the
police did not use means reasonably tailored to apprehend those
involved in ongoing criminal activity; the informant's repeated in-
quiries over a six month period constituted an improper method of
persuasion which carried with it a substantial risk that the offense
would be committed by one who was not otherwise ready to com-
mit it.
Marrero is the first post-Cruz case in which a court has consid-
ered the parameters of the propriety of police inducements in a
factual scenario different from the drunken bum decoy operation
reviewed in Cruz.9 8 Only one court after Cruz has held police con-
duct improper when the accused was already involved in the crimi-
nal activity.9 Other courts in Florida and other jurisdictions have
identified police inducements that would constitute entrapment as
a matter of law where the inducements would be sufficient to over-
come otherwise innocent persons. Thus, even if the police legiti-
mately target a defendant and attempt to catch him "in the act,"
their techniques may be so improper as to constitute entrapment
as a matter of law. For example, entrapment as a matter of law has
been found where the inducement involved sex.100 Appeals to loy-
96. Id. at 2318. The defendant had been unemployed for two months and had fallen
behind on the mortgage payments on his family home. He decided to sell the marijuana out
of desperation.
97. Id. at 2318; see supra text accompanying note 89.
98. Marrero v. State, 10 Fla. L.W. 2317 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 8, 1985), aff'd on rehearing,
11 Fla. L.W. 59 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 24, 1985); see also Jones v. State, 11 Fla. L.W. 425 (Fla.
2d DCA Feb. 14, 1986).
99. See State v. Eichel, 11 Fla. L.W. 660 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 12, 1986).
100. Spencer v. State, 263 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972) (lure of sex held entrapment
where female undercover agent went with the defendant to his apartment, drank wine with
him, purchased cigarette rolling papers and smoked the defendant's marijuana); People v.
Wisneski, 292 N.W.2d 196 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (female informant performing fellatio on a
doctor to induce him to write her an illegal prescription held an improper inducement);
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 484 A.2d 159 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (court held that romantic
lure was improper where female agent went on several dates with defendant, kissed him,
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alty and friendship have been found improper inducements. 1 '
These cases turn on the notion that the function of police in our
society is not to place citizens in situations where they are likely to
succumb to overwhelming temptation. Furthermore, the restric-
tions on police activities should be enforced uniformly, regardless
of the defendant's predisposition, in order to protect the rights of
all people. Although Florida courts have evinced a willingness to
extend the new entrapment test beyond the bounds of the decoy
scenario, post-Cruz jurisprudence must further define the circum-
stances under which the police activity undertaken to ensnare an
individual should be condemned although he is engaged in ongoing
criminal activity. Ultimately, the decisions of cases such as these
will form the teeth of the future entrapment doctrine, a doctrine
which could have great impact as a defense to improper police con-
duct and serve as a practical test for acceptable police activity.
Kelly M. Haynes
and talked him into buying some marijuana for her use).
101. Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35 (8th. Cir. 1921) (informant, who was an acquain-
tance of the defendant, improperly induced the defendant to sell morphine by representing
that he and his wife were very ill and in need of the drug); People v. Crawford, 328 N.W.2d
377 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (informant induced a co-worker at a hospital to supply her with
Valium; co-worker knew the informant's son was in the hospital in serious condition and got
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